Secret scanning

This repository is public. Three layers stop private material before it lands:

1. GitHub secret scanning, push protection and Dependabot security updates (repo settings).
2. .github/workflows/gitleaks.yml runs gitleaks with .gitleaks.toml on every pull request and merge group. It also fails if an entire/* ref exists on origin.
3. Optional local gate: ln -sf ../../scripts/gitleaks-precommit.sh .git/hooks/pre-commit.

Project rules

Rule id	Catches
home-path	/Users/<name>/ and /home/<name>/
claude-session-url	claude.ai/code/session_… links
claude-cse-id	cse_… cloud session ids

Placeholder names (user, you, dev, test, YourName, …) are allowlisted by name in .gitleaks.toml. Test input that needs a session id uses a FAKE prefix. Add a new placeholder name there with a reason; never allowlist a file.

A fake fixture in an earlier commit

The PR scan checks every commit in the branch, so a fake fixture that one commit added and a later commit removed still fails it. Record that one finding in .gitleaksignore by its fingerprint (commit:file:rule:line, printed in the job log). A fingerprint names one commit, so it can’t hide a new leak. Build leak-shaped test input at run time (["", "Users", "alice", ""].join("/")) so it never reaches the committed source.

Sensitive literals

Never write a project name or gated flag into .gitleaks.toml. Put such literals in .gitleaks.local.toml (gitignored); the local gate loads it when present.

Note

evals/results/*.json come from claude plugin eval, which records absolute paths. Redact them before committing; the home-path rule fails the PR otherwise.